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Family violence is a pervasive and costly problem, yet there is no consensus on how to 
interpret the phenomenon of violence by one family member against another.  Some 
analysts assume that violence has an instrumental role in intra-family incentives.  Others 
argue that violent episodes represent a loss of control that the offender immediately 
regrets.  In this paper we specify and test a behavioral model of the latter form in which 
the strength of an emotional cue depends on outcomes relative to expectations and 
individuals exhibit loss aversion.  Our key hypothesis is that negative emotional cues -- 
benchmarked relative to a rationally expected reference point -- make a breakdown of 
control more likely.  We test this hypothesis using data on police reports of family 
violence on Sundays during the professional football season.   Controlling for location 
and time fixed effects, weather factors, the pre-game point spread, and the size of the 
local viewing audience, we find that upset losses by the home team (losses in games that 
the home team was predicted to win by more than 3 points) lead to an 8 percent increase 
in police reports of at-home male-on-female intimate partner violence.  There is no 
corresponding effect on female-on-male violence.  Consistent with the behavioral 
prediction that losses matter more than gains, upset victories by the home team have (at 
most) a small dampening effect on family violence.  We also find that unexpected losses 
in highly salient or frustrating games have a 50% to 100% larger impact on rates of 
family violence.  The evidence that payoff-irrelevant events affect the rate of family 
violence leads us to conclude that at least some fraction of family violence is better 
characterized as a breakdown of control than as an intra-family incentive system.  More 
generally, the empirical findings suggest that gain-loss utility with a rational reference 
point could be a useful approach to modeling other cues and visceral influences. 
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  Violence by men against their partners and children is one of the most common yet 
perplexing forms of violent behavior.
1  Building on a rational choice perspective (Becker, 1968), 
economists have adopted an instrumental interpretation of family violence, modeling violent acts 
as part of an optimal incentive contract between family members (Chwe, 1990), or as a credible 
signal to outside parties (Bloch and Rao, 2002).
2  In contrast, sociologists have argued that 
family violence represents expressive behavior that is triggered when conflictual interactions 
escalate out of control.
3  Formal models with a risk of a breakdown in rationality have been 
developed recently to explain “present bias” in inter-temporal consumption (Fudenberg and 
Levine, 2004; Benhabib and Bisin, 2004), drug use by addicts (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004), and 
other failures of self-control (Loewenstein and O’Donohue, 2007).
4  
  In this paper we specify and test a simple behavioral model in which violence arises 
when interactions between the members of conflict-prone families cross the line from heated to 
physical.  Our key hypothesis is that the risk of violence is affected by the gain-loss utility 
associated with salient emotional cues, where the strength of the cue depends on a rationally 
expected reference point.  Specifically, we assume that negative cues – based on realizations 
relative to expected outcomes – increase the risk of violence.  We test this hypothesis using 
police reports of family violence incidents on Sundays during the regular season of the National 
                                                 
1 The estimated number of physical assaults inflicted on adult women in the U.S. by their intimate partners ranges 
from 2.5 to 4.5 million per year (Rand and Rennison, 2005): the implied risk of physical assault by an intimate 
partner is on the order of 1 percent per year.  Wilt and Olsen (1996) estimate that at least 5% of all injured women 
treated at hospital emergency departments are victims of family violence.  About one-third of female homicide 
victims are killed by their husband or partner (Fox and Zawitz, 2007).  
2 A third possibility, examined by Tauchen, Witte, and Long (1991) is that male partners get positive utility from 
violence.  Chwe’s (1990) model of violence is similar in spirit to Dobash and Dobash’s (1979) “patriarchal” model 
of the use of violence by men to control their partner and children. 
3 Some of the major contributions to this “family conflict” view include Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz (1980), Gelles 
and Straus (1988), and  Straus, Gelles, and Smith (1990).  There is an extensive psychology literature on “loss of 
control” or failure of self-regulation: see e.g., Baumeister, Heatherton and Tice (1994) and Baumeister and 
Heatherton (1996). 
4 Thaler and Shefrin (1981) present an early economic model that emphasizes issues of self-control.  
  1Football League (NFL).  We use a Poisson regression framework to analyze National Incident 
Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data from states that are home to six different NFL teams, 
focusing on the effect of wins and losses of the home team on reported family violence incidents.  
Building on Koszegi and Rabin (2006) we assume the reference point for the emotional cue 
associated with the game outcome is the expected probability of a win, which we infer from the 
pre-game Las Vegas point spread. 
  Our focus on the impact of professional football games is motivated by two 
considerations.  On the one hand, many fans feel strong emotional attachment to local NFL 
teams.  Home games on Sunday afternoons typically attract between a quarter and a half of the 
television audience in markets with a local NFL team.
5  Team affinity is reinforced by extensive 
pre- and post-game coverage by local news and entertainment media.  On the other hand, the 
existence of a well-organized betting market allows us to infer the expected outcome of each 
game.
6  Assuming that a game outcome is random, conditional on the pre-game point spread, we 
can interpret any difference between the rate of family violence following a win or loss as a 
causal effect of the outcome of the game.  Moreover, we can easily define the strength of the 
emotional cue associated with a win or a loss in a given game. 
  Our empirical analysis points to four main conclusions.   First, controlling for location 
fixed effects, the pre-game point spread, seasonality and weather factors, and the size of the local 
viewing audience, we find that an “upset loss” by the home team (a loss when the team was 
predicted to win by more than 3 points) leads to an 8 percent increase in the number of police 
                                                 
5 In 2008, NFL Sunday football games were the highest-rated local programs in 88% of the market-weeks.   
Nationally, the top 10 television programs for 18-49 year old men in 2008 were all NFL football games (NFL and 
Nielsen Media Research, cited in Ground Report, January 7, 2009).  
6 Football betting uses a point spread, rather than odds, to clear the betting market (see Levitt, 2004 for a good 
description of the institutions involved).  Previous research (e.g., Pankoff, 1968; Gandar et al., 1988) has shown that 
the point spread is a unbiased (and relatively accurate) predictor of game outcomes, though there is some evidence 
that the betting market is not fully efficient.  See Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) for a general discussion of betting 
and related markets, and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) on the information aggregating property of betting markets.    
  2reports of at-home male-on-female intimate partner violence.  The spike in violence is 
concentrated in a narrow time window after the end of the game.  Second, consistent with the 
standard behavioral prediction that losses matter more than gains (i.e., loss aversion) “upset 
wins” (a win when the team was expected to lose by more than 3 points) have at most a small 
effect in reducing family violence.
7  Third, upset losses in more salient games (those involving a 
traditional rival, or occurring when the home team is still in playoff contention) have a larger 
effect on the rate of intimate partner violence, as do unexpected losses after games involving an 
unusual number of sacks, turnovers, or penalties.  Fourth, we find that NFL game outcomes have 
little or no effect on police reports of female-on-male intimate partner violence.  We also find no 
significant effect on violence against children, though the low rate of police-reported violence 
against children limits the power of this analysis.
8  
  Our estimates of the effect of unexpected losses in local football games on the rate of 
violence against female partners are large: an 8 percent impact is comparable to the effect of a 
hot day (over 80 degrees Fahrenheit), and is about one-fourth the magnitude of the spike in 
violence on a major holiday like New Year’s Eve or July 4
th.
9  The strong impact of random 
external factors on the rate of family violence provides compelling evidence that at least some 
portion of family violence arises through a breakdown of control, rather than as instrumental 
behavior driven by purely rational choice.  The finding of a strong effect for unexpected losses, 
                                                 
7 As discussed below, our model suggests that the most violence-prone families will avoid watching a game together 
(or take other protective action) when a loss is likely.  This behavior will reinforce the asymmetric response to 
unexpected losses and unexpected wins.  
8 In a recent paper Rees and Schnepel (2009) analyze the effect of upset and other wins and losses on crime rates in 
college towns on days when there is a home game.  Interestingly, they find that many types of crimes are affected by 
both upset wins and upset losses, including assaults, vandalism, disorderly conduct, and liquor-related offenses. 
9 Vazquez, Stohr and Purkiss (2005) analyze NIBRS data for one state (Idaho) and show that intimate partner 
violence rates are typically higher on holidays.  We summarize our own investigation of the pattern of family 
violence across different days of the year in Section VI below. 
  3but not for unexpected wins, provides empirical support for a model with gain-loss utility based 
on a rationally expected reference point as in Koszegi and Rabin (2006).
10
  The next section presents a simple model of emotional cues and violence that provides an 
interpretative framework for our empirical analysis.  Section III describes the NIBRS data on 
family violence incidents and the NFL data that we combine into an estimation sample.  Section 
IV presents our econometric model and our main estimation results.  We then discuss a number 
of extensions and robustness checks in Section V, and conclude in Section VI with a discussion 
of our results. 
 
II. A Simple Model of Emotional Cues and Family Violence 
a. Basic Setup 
  In this section we present a simplified one-period model of the impact of external 
emotional cues on observed rates of family violence.  We combine ideas from the “family 
conflict” paradigm in sociology (Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz, 1980) with an hypothesis about 
the effect of emotionally engaging external events, based on a gain-loss framework with a 
rational reference point (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006).  As in Bernheim and Rangel’s (2004) model 
of drug use, we assume that agents who are at risk of committing a violent act can take action to 
avoid exposure to emotional cues that may trigger violence.  
  We focus on the risk of violence by an adult male with a female spouse or other intimate 
partner.
11  For a given couple, we assume that the probability of a conflictual interaction (a 
                                                 
10 The only other paper we are aware of which empirically tests a Koszegi and Rabin (2006) type of model with a 
rationally expected reference point and gain-loss utility is a recent working paper by Crawford and Meng (2009). 
11 Strictly speaking our model focuses on the risk of violent interactions between partners: the outcome of such 
interactions could involve injuries to both partners.  In our data (described below) about 80% of the victims of 
intimate partner violence are women.  A similar fraction of female victims is reported in the National Crime 
Victimization Survey.  We therefore discuss the model as if the primary agent is a potential male perpetrator of 
family violence against his spouse or partner. 
  4heated disagreement or argument) is q (0≤q≤1), and that q is distributed across the population 
with distribution function F(q).  We assume that with some probability h ≥ 0 a conflictual 
interaction escalates to violence (i.e., the agent “loses control”).  Thus, for a given couple the 
probability of violence is qh. 
  The agent can choose whether or not to watch a locally televised NFL game.  The 
outcome of the game is a binary indicator y with p=P(y=1) representing the probability of a 
home team victory.  At the conclusion of the game an agent who has watched the game 
experiences an emotional cue that depends on y−E[y] = y−p.  We assume this cue in turn affects 
the probability of losing control during a conflictual interaction.  In particular, we assume that 
(1)  h  =   h
0  − μ( y−p)  , 
where μ is the gain-loss utility associated with the cue, with 
  μ( y−p)  =    α ( y−p) ,   y−p < 0     
      =      β ( y−p) ,   y−p > 0  , 
for positive constants α and β.  Loss aversion predicts that α > β, i.e., that the marginal effect of a 
positive cue is smaller than the marginal effect of a negative cue.
12
 Recognizing  that  y is binary, the implied probabilities of a loss of control are 
(2)  h
L  =   h
0   +   αp            if  y=0   (a loss) 
  h
W  =   h
0   −  β(1−p)     if  y=1   (a win) . 
The functions h
L(p) and h
W(p) are graphed in Figure 1.  The upper line is the probability of 
violence in the event of a loss.  At p=0 a home-team loss is fully anticipated and there is no 
emotional cue, so h
L = h
0.   For any other p>0 a loss is “bad news”, with a stronger negative cue 
                                                 
12 See Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) for an overview of the evidence of loss aversion in a variety of 
contexts.  In a review and synthesis of the literature on aggressive behavior or groups of spectators at a sporting 
event, Branscombe and Wan (1992) discuss the possible effects of wining and losing on aggression.  They conclude 
the empirical findings in the literature are inconclusive. 
  5the higher is p, implying that h
L is increasing in p.  The lower line in the figure is the probability 
of violence in the event of a win.  A win when p=0 is the “best possible” news, leading the 
lowest probability of violence h
0 − β.  At higher values of p a win is increasingly likely and the 
deviation of the risk of violence from the baseline rate h
0 is smaller.  At p=1 a win is expected 
and there is no emotional cue so h
W = h
0.  Notice that when α > β, the gap between the risk of 
violence in the event of a win and the event of a loss is increasing in p.  
  At the beginning of the period the agent has to decide whether to watch the game (and be 
exposed to the emotional cue) or not.  We assume the agent’s preferences do not directly depend 
on the emotional cue, although he rationally anticipates the consequences of a win or loss if he 
decides to watch the game.  The expected utility of an agent of type q for not watching the game, 
watching the home team win, and watching the home team lose is 
  u
j   −  qh
jv     for  j = 0 (not watching), W (a win), and L (a loss) 
where v>0 is the utility cost of a violent episode.  We assume that u
W≥ u
0≥ u
L, and that u
W> u
L, 
so the agent strictly prefers to watch a win rather than a loss.
13  Combining the expressions for 
expected utility with equation (2), the expected payoff of watching the game (relative to not 
watching) is 
(3)  G(p; q) =  pu
W  +  (1−p) u
L   − u
0 − (α−β)p(1−p)qv . 
Note that if α=β the expected payoff from watching the game does not depend on the agent’s 
type (q) or the cost of violence (v).  In this “linear” case the increased risk of violence in the 
event of a loss for an agent who decides to watch the game is just offset by the decreased risk of 
violence in the event of a win.  When a negative emotional cue from a loss has a larger effect 
                                                 
13 As we show in Section III, below, the local television audience is larger for games that the home team is more 
likely to win, so this appears to be a plausible assumption. 
  6than the positive cue from a win, however, then the payoff from watching is decreasing in q and 
v. 
  Inspection of equation (3) shows that an agent in a conflict-free relationship (q=0) will 
watch the game if p> p
c and not watch if p< p
c, where  
   p
c = [ u
0 −  u
L ] /  [u
W −  u
L ]  ,  with     0 ≤ p
c< 1 . 
Among the set of agents with some probability of a conflictual interaction, there is a cutoff type 
q
*(p), such that those with q≤ q
*(p) will watch a game with a probability p of a home-team 
victory and those with q> q
*(p) will not.  This cutoff is defined by  
(4)  q
*(p)  =  [ pu
W  +  (1−p) u
L   − u
0 ] /   (α−β)p(1−p)v. 
The cutoff type has the properties that: (i) for p< p
c, q
*(p) = 0 (i.e., no types watch the game); 
and (ii) for p> p
c, q
*(p) is strictly increasing in p.  Thus, as the probability of a home team 
victory increases, men with a higher risk of violence are drawn to watch the game.
14
  In our empirical analysis we compare the effects of wins and losses on the rate of family 
violence, controlling for the probability p of a home-team victory.  In the event of a loss the 
probability of a violent episode is 
   (h
0+αp)q          for agents with q≤ q
*(p) who watched , 
     h
0q            for agents with q > q
*(p) who did not watch.  
In the event of a home team win, on the other hand, the risk of violence is: 
  (h
0−β(1−p))q     for agents with q≤ q
*(p) who watched,  
     h
0q            for agents with  q> q
*(p) who did not watch. 
Thus the difference in the expected rate of violence following a loss, relative to a win, is 
(5)  Δ(risk | p) =  [ β + (α−β) p]    ∫
0
q*(p)q dF(q) . 
                                                 
14 Another interpretation is that when p is low, the partners and children of higher-risk men leave the home or take 
other defensive actions. 
  7Assuming that α > β this expression is increasing in p for two reasons.  First, as shown in Figure 
1, for those who watch the game the deviation in the predicted rate of violence between a loss 
and a win is increasing in p.  Second, when p is higher more men – and in particular more men in 
more conflict-prone relationships – will watch the game. 
 
b. Testing the Model 
  Our model predicts there will be a higher rate of family violence following a home team 
loss than a home team victory.  The maximum relative effect is predicted for an “upset” loss (a 
loss when the home team had a high probability of victory).  The predicted relative effect of loss 
when the home team was very likely to lose – or equivalently, the relative effect of an “upset 
win” – is smaller, both because of loss-aversion in the gain-loss function that generates the 
emotional cue of a game outcome, and because we expect relatively risk-prone agents to avoid 
watching a game when the likelihood of a loss is high. 
  We test these predictions using a Poisson model for the number of police-reported 
episodes of family violence in a set of cities, towns, and municipalities in states with a “home” 
NFL team.  To keep the analysis as simple as possible we limit attention to violence reports on 
Sundays during the fall regular NFL season.  As discussed in more detail below we classify 
games based on the Las Vegas point spread into three categories: home team likely to win, 
opposing team likely to win, or a game expected to be close.  We then fit models that include the 
full set of interactions between the ex ante classification and whether the game was a won or lost 
by the home team (3×2=6 categories), treating the non-game days (i.e., a day where the home 
team is has a bye week or is playing on another day of the week) as the base case.  (We also fit a 
model with a polynomial in the point spread, interacted with the game outcome). 
  8  Our key identification assumption is that the outcome of the game is random, conditional 
on the information contained in the Las Vegas spread.  Under this assumption, we can interpret 
any difference between the rate of family violence following a win or loss conditional on the 
pre-game spread as a causal effect of the outcome of the game itself.  As in a classical 
randomized controlled trial, the assumption that the game outcome is “as good as random” 
conditional on the spread has the prediction that one should obtain the same effect of the game 
outcome, regardless of whether we condition on other control variables or not.  As we show, this 
is in fact the case: although other factors, such as the weather, have a significant effect on the 
rate of family violence, our estimates of the effect of the game outcome, conditional on the range 
of the point spread, are quite stable. 
 
III. Data Sources and Sample Construction 
a. Measuring Family Violence: NIBRS Data on Police-Reported Violence 
  Our empirical analysis is based on police reports of family violence in the National 
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS).  Incidents in the NIBRS system are reports of crime 
to individual police agencies.
15  A report does not have to be associated with an arrest to be 
included in NIBRS.
16  Each incident report includes information on the victim (age, gender, 
etc.), the offender (gender, relationship to the victim), and the nature of the incident (including 
date, time of day, location, and whether the victim was injured). 
  NIBRS has several advantages as a source of information on family violence.  Most 
importantly for our purposes, it represents the universe of family violence incidents recorded by 
a given agency, with information on the date and time of day of the incident.  Since family 
                                                 
15 We analyze incident reports for city and county agencies, and exclude college, state police, and special agencies. 
16 About half of family assaults in the NIBRS result in an arrest (Durose et al, 2005; Hirschel, 2008).  Direct arrests 
by police officers with no intervening report of a crime are also included in NIBRS. 
  9violence is relatively rare, a complete count is needed to accurately study crime rates on specific 
days in specific locations.  NIBRS incident reports are also collected in real time, so the 
information on the date and time of the incident is relatively precise.  In contrast, most other 
sources of information on family violence are based on recall of occurrences over the previous 
month or year, and cannot be used to measure daily crime rates. 
  A limitation of NIBRS is that it only includes police-reported family violence.
17  
Nevertheless, a comparison of the implied rate of intimate partner violence (IPV) experienced by 
women age 18-54 in the NIBRS to the rate in the 1995 National Violence Against Women 
Survey (NVAWS) suggests that NIBRS captures a relatively high fraction of serious violence – 
episodes that would be classified as assault (either simple or aggravated assault) or intimidation.  
Specifically, we calculated that the implied annual risk of IPV is approximately 1.6 % per year in 
the 2000 NIBRS, versus 1.3 % per year (for assaults and intimidation) in the NVAWS (1995-
96).
18
  A second limitation of the NIBRS data is that participation by individual police agencies 
is voluntary.  Although participation rates have risen steadily over the past 15 years, many states 
still have no agencies in the program, including California, Illinois, and New York.  Moreover, in 
some participating states only a fraction of police agencies report to NIBRS.  Typically the 
largest cities in a state are absent, at least in early years of the sample.  As a result of these 
features, the total fraction of the U.S. population covered by NIBRS was only 4% in 1995, but 
rises to approximately 25% by 2006. 
                                                 
17 Among adult female respondents to the National Crime Victimization Survey who report being a victim of assault 
by their spouse or partner, only about 55% report that the incident was reported to police (Durose et al., 2005).   
18 Using a variety of published data sources, we calculated the incidence rates for violence by an intimate partner 
against women, aged 18-54.  For the NIBRS, we inflated the number of incidents for which information on the 
identity of the perpetrator is available, assuming information is missing at random.  NIBRS data for available 
agencies were inflated to the national level. 
  10  Table 1 provides summary statistics for IPV incidents in the NIBRS dataset.  IPV is 
defined by the type of crime and the relationship of the victim and offender.  Our measure of 
violence includes simple assault, aggravated assault, and intimidation.  Our definition of an 
intimate partner is a spouse (including a common-law or ex spouse) or boyfriend/girlfriend.  Our 
main dependent variable in the empirical analysis is at-home male-on-female IPV occurring 
between the hours of 12 PM and midnight Eastern Time, although we explore other IPV 
incidents as well.  Panel A summarizes the rates for this main dependent variable for the set of 
NIBRS agencies used in our analysis (i.e., agencies in the set of states that we match to NFL 
teams, as described in the next section).  Across all days of the year, the rate is .70 per 100,000 
(total population).
19  As has been noted in other studies using NIBRS data (e.g., Vazquez, Stohr 
and Purkiss, 2005) the rate of violence varies both by day of the week and season of the year.  
Weekends, especially Saturdays and Sundays, have the highest rate of IPV; rates are also 
somewhat higher in summer.  In view of the important day-of-week and seasonal patterns in 
family violence, and the relatively small number of games on days other than Sunday, we have 
elected to simplify our empirical analysis by limiting our sample to the 17 Sundays during the 
regular NFL season.  This restricted sample has the important advantage that we observe rates of 
violence reported by a given agency on the same day in different years, and rates reported by 
multiple agencies on the same day in a given year.  
  Panels B and C of Table 1 provide summary statistics for our estimation sample of 
Sundays during the regular football season.  In Panel B we present rates of intimate partner 
violence by location and victim-offender relationship. Most of the victims of intimate partner 
                                                 
19 The hours between 12 PM and midnight account for 61% of at-home male-on-female IPV.  Ideally the rate of 
intimate partner violence would be expressed relative to the number of intimate partner couples.  In 2000 there were 
approximately 21 intimate partnerships per 100 people in the U.S. population: thus on average the rate per couple is 
approximately 4.8 times the rate per person (U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1).  In our empirical 
analysis, this is not an issue as we use models based on counts that include police agency fixed effects. 
  11violence are women (82%) and a majority are victimized at home (84%).
20  For these reasons, 
our main analysis focuses on male-on-female at-home violence.  Within this class of incidents, 
violence by husbands against their wives account for 54% of incidents and violence by men 
against unmarried female partners account for 46%. 
  Panel C narrows the focus to male-on-female violence occurring at home.  To crudely 
characterize the severity of an incident, we classified all aggravated assaults and other incidents 
involving physical injury as “serious assaults.”
21  The remainder (simple assaults and 
intimidation with no injuries) are classified as “minor assaults.”  Using this classification just 
over one-half (52%) of male-on-female at-home IPV incidents are serious assaults, while the 
balance are minor assaults. 
  Alcohol (and drug) use is a mechanism that is widely believed to contribute to violent 
crime, and which might be expected to amplify the effects of emotional cues.
22  Unfortunately, 
there is only limited information on alcohol and drug use by offenders in the NIBRS dataset.  
Police can report whether the offender was suspected of using drugs or alcohol during or shortly 
before the offense.  Overall, about 20% of at-home male-on-female incidents of IPV list alcohol 
or drugs as a contributing factor.  The relatively low rate of alcohol and drug involvement could 
                                                 
20 The relative fraction of female victims of intimate partner violence is controversial because some sources of 
information on  family violence (in particular, questionnaires that use behavioral checklists to ask about past 
episodes of slapping, pushing, throwing articles) often find that men and women are equally likely to be 
“victimized” (e.g., Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz, 1980).  As discussed by Hamby (2005) victimization surveys, 
police reports, and other sources that measure more serious episodes of violence all find far higher rates of female 
victims – typically in the range of 70-90% (Hamby, 2005, Table I).  
21 The NIBRS dataset uses the FBI classification of aggravated assault, which is an unlawful attack where the 
offender wields a weapon or the victim suffers obvious severe or aggravated injury.  Simple assault is also an 
unlawful attack, but does not involve a weapon or obvious severe or aggravated bodily injury (minor injuries such as 
bruises or cuts often accompany simple assault, however).  Intimidation is placing a person in reasonable fear of 
bodily harm without a weapon or physical attack. 
22 Klostermann and Fals-Steward (2006) present a comprehensive review of the literature on the inter-relationship of 
alcohol use and IPV.  In general, alcohol use appears to be positively correlated with the risk of IPV.  The causal 
effect is less clear. 
  12reflect under-reporting, or a tendency by police to cite alcohol and drugs as contributing factor 
only in cases with high levels of intoxication. 
 
b. Matching NFL Team Data to NIBRS Violence Data 
  We link the NIBRS data to the team records for “local” NFL franchises.  Since NIBRS 
data are not yet available for most major cities, relatively few NFL teams can be matched to 
crime incidents in the city or county directly surrounding their home stadium.  As an alternative, 
we focus on reports from police agencies in states where there is a single NFL team.  We then 
assign all jurisdictions within a state to that team.
23  Following this approach, and imposing the 
restriction that at least 4 years of data are available for a given team, a total of six NFL teams can 
be matched to roughly 800 different NIBRS agencies. 
  Our decision to assign all residents of a state to their “local” NFL team is likely to 
diminish the average strength of the emotional cue associated with a game outcome for that 
team.  Arguably, these cues are stronger for people who live close to a team’s home city and are 
routinely exposed to media coverage of the team, and weaker for those in other areas of a state.  
Weaker emotional cues presumably lead to attenuated estimates of the effect of wins versus 
losses, relative to the effect for people who live in the home city.  Thus, we suspect that our 
assignment procedure is likely to lead to a conservative assessment of the effect of emotional 
cues on family violence. 
  Table 2 shows the six football teams in our sample, with the associated NIBRS states 
listed in parentheses.  For each team we also show the win-loss record in the sample years for 
which NIBRS data are available, and the number of reporting agencies in the state in that year.  
Three teams (the Carolina Panthers, Detroit Lions, and New England Patriots) have NIBRS data 
                                                 
23 We match the New England Patriots to three states: Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire. 
  13available for all 12 years, starting in 1995 and continuing to 2006.  The remaining three teams 
(the Denver Broncos, Kansas City Chiefs, and Tennessee Titans) enter the NIBRS sample in 
later years.  Note that within a state the number of reporting agencies in NIBRS tends to rise, 
though there are fluctuations up and down in some later years as agencies drop in or out. 
  The win-loss records reported in Table 2 display wide variation, with some teams making 
the playoffs more often than others.  Detroit had a poor win-loss record for most of the sample 
period, while Denver and New England were very successful teams.  Even within a team, 
however, there is a fair amount of year-to-year variation.  For example, Denver had a 14-2 win-
loss record in the 1998 season (and won the Superbowl), but had a losing season in 1999.  Since 
predicted game outcomes tend to be based on recent past performance, these patterns hint at the 
prevalence of both upset losses (e.g., during the Denver Bronco’s 1999 season) and upset wins 
(e.g., during the Kansas City Chief’s 2003 season).  We characterize upset losses and upset wins 
more formally using the Las Vegas point spread in the next subsection. 
  In all, the 6 teams in our sample can be matched to 993 regular season football games and 
53 playoff games.  The characteristics of these games are shown in the upper panel of Table 3.  
The vast majority (87%) of the regular season games were played on Sundays.  As noted earlier, 
given the seasonal and intra-week variation in family violence rates, we elected to simplify our 
empirical design by focusing on regular-season Sunday games.  The characteristics of these 
games and their associated local television market are summarized in panels B and C of Table 3.  
 
c. Expected Outcomes from Betting Markets 
  A key feature of NFL football is the existence of a well-organized betting market that 
allows us to infer the expected outcome of each game.  The main betting market for NFL games 
  14is run by Las Vegas bookmakers, who equilibrate the demand on each side of a bet using a 
“point spread,” rather than odds (as in pari-mutuel betting).
24  If the point spread is -3 for one 
team against another, the team must win by 3 points or more in order for a bet on that team to 
pay off.  The market assessment of the outcome of a game is contained in the closing value of the 
point spread (the “closing line”).
25
  Previous research has suggested that the point spread is an unbiased predictor of the 
actual outcome of the game (e.g., Gandar et al., 1988).  To verify this conclusion, we collected 
data on point spreads and final scores for all 3,725 NFL football game played during the 1995 to 
2006 seasons.  Figure 2 shows the relationship between the actual and predicted point spread in 
each game.  As expected, the actual spread is “noisier” than the predicted spread, but the two are 
positively correlated.  In fact, a regression of the actual spread on the predicted spread yields a 
coefficient of 1.01 (s.e. = 0.03).  Thus, there is no evidence against the null hypothesis of an 
efficient prediction.  Moreover, the R-squared of the relationship is relatively strong (0.20) 
suggesting that the Las Vegas point spread is a reasonably informative predictor of game 
outcomes. 
  The vertical lines in Figure 2 divide the predicted spreads into three regions, depending 
on whether the home team is predicted to win by more than a field goal (a spread of -3), 
predicted to have a close game (a spread of -3 to 3), or predicted to lose by more than a field goal 
(a spread of +3).  Roughly one-third games fall into each of these regions.  In our empirical 
                                                 
24 There is an extensive literature on the economics of NFL betting, including Pankoff (1968), Gandar et al (1988), 
and Levitt (2004).   
25 As discussed by Levitt (2004), point spreads adjust relatively infrequently from their opening values and 
bookmakers sometimes take relatively large positions in particular games.  Levitt argues that these features arise 
because bookmakers are better predictors than other bettors (i.e., that the “market” of individual betters is biased).    
For our purposes the key feature of the spread is that it is the “best” prior estimate of the outcome of the game. 
  15analysis we use these three categories to classify games as “predicted wins”, “predicted close 
games”, and predicted losses” for the home team.
26
  Our theoretical model is written in terms of the ex-ante probability of a home-team win, 
rather than the point spread.  The mapping between the two is shown in Figure 3.  To derive this 
relationship we regressed the probability of a victory by the home team on a third order 
polynomial in the spread.  The fitted relationship follows the expected “inverse S-curve” shape 
and is symmetric.  For spreads of ±14 points (a range that includes 98% of games) the 
probability of a win is approximately linear, with each one-point increase in the spread 
translating into a 3% decrease in the probability of a win.  For games with a spread of less than 
-3 points (“predicted wins”) the probability of a home team victory is 60% or greater.  For 
“predicted losses” (spread > 3) the probability of a win is 41% or less. 
  Panel B of Table 3 summarizes the predicted outcomes of the 866 regular season Sunday 
games in our IPV analysis sample.  Of these games, 316 (36%) were predicted wins for the home 
team, 245 (28%) were predicted losses, and 305 (35%) were predicted close games.  The greater 
number of predicted wins than losses reflects the inclusion in our sample of two relatively 
successful teams (Denver and New England).  We also report the actual outcomes of the games: 
70% of the predicted wins were in fact victories for the home team, while only 32% of the 
predicted losses resulted in a victory.  The predicted close games are almost evenly split, 
consistent with the unbiasedness property of the point spread. 
  Panel B also shows two other important characteristics of the games in our estimation 
sample that we exploit in later analyses: the starting time, and the likely emotional salience of a 
game.  The majority of games in the sample had a 1:00 PM starting time, 26 percent had a 4:00 
                                                 
26 Few games have a spread of zero, and there are no games with a spread of -0.5 or 0.5.  This likely reflects the fact 
that given the NFL’s overtime rules, tie games are rare events; only three games ended in a tie during the entire 
period from 1995-2006. 
  16PM start time, and only 6% were nighttime games (8:00 PM start time).  We consider three 
measures of emotional salience: whether the home team is still in playoff contention, whether the 
game was played against a traditional “rival” team, and whether the game involved an unusually 
high number of sacks, turnovers, or penalty yards.
27   A majority of games (70%) are played 
when the team is still in playoff contention.  Some 20% are played against a traditional rival.  
And about 40% of games involve a relatively high number of sacks, turnovers, or penalty yards.  
We define “highly salient” games as contests in which the home team was still in playoff 
contention and either played against a traditional rival or had an unusual number of sacks, 
turnovers, or penalty yards.  By this criterion about 40% of the games in our sample are highly 
salient. 
 
d. Fan Attachment to Local NFL Teams 
  Another important feature of NFL football is that the games attract a lot of local fan 
interest.  NFL Sunday football games are often the highest-rated program in a local market (see 
footnote 5).  To gauge the strength of fan attachment to the local teams in our dataset, we 
purchased data on local television viewership from Nielsen Media Research (“Nielsen”) for the 
six television markets that match the teams in our sample.  Nielsen measures viewership in each 
of these local markets (known as Designated Market Areas) using metering devises attached to a 
random sample of television sets.  The company provides ratings information for each program 
shown in a local market: each rating point represents 1% of all television households in a local 
market (whether or not a household’s television is turned on). 
                                                 
27 To develop an indicator for being in contention, we fit a series of models that relate the likelihood of advancing to 
the playoffs to the team’s win-loss record after various numbers of games played.  We classify a team as out of 
contention once the predicted probability (based on the historical record for teams with a similar win-loss record at 
the same point in the season) is under 10%.  We identified traditional rivalries using information from Wikipedia.  A 
list of the rival team pairs we use is available on request. 
  17  Panel C of Table 3 shows the Nielsen ratings for regular season Sunday football games in 
the Designated Market Areas associated with the 6 teams in our estimation sample.  On average, 
one-fourth of all households watch their local team play on a typical Sunday.  For particularly 
compelling games, nearly one-half of all television households tune in to watch.  The strength of 
fans’ attachment to their local NFL team is illustrated by the fact that on a Sunday with no home 
game, the viewing audience is only roughly one-third as large.  These television viewing patterns 
suggest that emotional cues from local football games should both be salient and affect a large 
number of intimate partners. 
  Figure 4 plots the number of households watching a game versus the spread, for the 
subset of games for which we were able to collect Nielsen data.  Our model is predicated on the 
assumption that fans strictly prefer to watch a win rather than a loss.  Consistent with this 
assumption, the local audience size is decreasing in the spread (i.e., increasing in the probability 
of a home-team victory).  The regression line drawn in the graph illustrates that for each one 
point increase in the spread, local audience size falls by 0.4 percentage points. 
 
IV. Econometric Model and Main Estimation Results 
a. Econometric Model 
  Given the incident-based nature of NIBRS data, we specify a Poisson regression model 
for the number of incidents of intimate partner violence reported by a given police agency on a 
given Sunday of the regular NFL season.  Specifically we assume that 
(6)   log(μjt)  =    θj  +  Xjtγ  +  f(pjt, yjt; λ) , 
where μjt represents the expected number of incidents of IPV reported by agency j in time period 
t, θj  represents a fixed effect for the agency (which controls for the size and overall 
  18characteristics of the population served by the agency), Xjt represents a set of time-varying 
controls (e.g., seasonality variables, local weather variables, or the size of the local television 
audience), and f(pjt, yjt; λ) is a general function of pjt, the probability of a victory by the “home” 
NFL team for a game played on date t, and yjt, the actual game outcome, with parameters λ. We 
assume that pjt  = p(Sjt) where Sjt is the observed point spread for the game, allowing us to write 
the model as 
(6′)   log(μjt)  =    θj  +  Xjtγ  +  g(Sjt, yjt; λ) . 
Our primary interest is in the effect of a loss or win by the home team, controlling for the spread.   
Assuming the Las Vegas betting market provides efficient forecasts of NFL game outcomes, the 
actual outcome of a game is “as good as random” when we control for the spread, and a 
specification like (6′) yields unbiased estimates of the causal effect of a loss relative to a win.
28
  An advantage of a Poisson specification is that fixed effects can be included without 
creating an incidental parameters problem (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).  This is potentially 
important in the NIBRS context because there are many small police agencies with relatively low 
counts of family violence incidents.  A second useful property of a Poisson specification is that 
consistency of the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of log(μjt) associated with 
the time-varying covariates (and in particular, the parameters λ) only requires that we have 
correctly specified the conditional mean for log(μjt) (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986).  Consistency 
does not require that the arrival process for IPV incidents is actually Poisson. 
 
b. Baseline Empirical Results 
                                                 
28 Formally, for a binary random variable y with mean p, E[ y | p, Z] = E[ y | p]  for any Z, so conditioning on p,  y is 
independent of Z.  Assuming the mapping p(S) from the spread to p is invertible and does not depend on Z, E[ y | S, 
Z] = E[ y | p, Z] = E[ y | p], so y is independent of Z conditioning on S.  
  19  Table 4 presents results for our baseline Poisson regressions for at-home male-on-female 
intimate partner violence occurring between the hours of 12 PM and 12 AM on Sundays of the 
NFL regular season.  In these specifications we assume that  
     g(Sjt, yjt , λ)   =   λ1·1(Sjt < −3)       +    λ2·1(Sjt < −3) 1(yjt = 0)  
   +       λ3·1(−3≤ Sjt ≤ 3)  +    λ4·1(−3≤ Sjt ≤ 3) 1(yjt = 0) 
   +       λ5·1( Sjt > 3)        +    λ6·1( Sjt > 3) 1(yjt = 1) , 
i.e., we include dummies for three ranges of the spread (predicted home team win (Sjt<−3); 
predicted close game (−3≤ Sjt ≤ 3); predicted home team loss ( Sjt > 3)) and interactions of these 
dummies with a game outcome indicator.  The main coefficients of interest are λ2, λ4, and λ6, 
which measure the effects of an upset loss, a close loss, and an upset win on the rate of IPV.  The 
coefficients associated with the range of the spread  (λ1, λ3, λ5) are also potentially interesting, 
but less easily interpreted, since variation in S may be correlated with other factors (like the size 
and composition of the viewing audience) that affect the likelihood of IPV. 
  The basic model in column (1) of Table 4 includes the spread and outcome variables and 
municipality fixed effects.  Columns 2-5 add in three sets of time-varying covariates: year, week, 
and holiday dummies; local weather conditions on the day of the game; and the Nielsen Rating 
for the local NFL game broadcast.  The Nielsen data are only available for the 90% of the game 
days in our sample that occur in 1997 or later.  To check the sensitivity of our results to the 
sample, we show in column 4 a specification identical to the one in column 3 (with municipality 
fixed effects and date and weather controls) but fit to the subsample with Nielsen data.   
  Focusing on the coefficients associated with the game outcome (in the first three rows of 
the table) notice that the estimates are quite stable across specifications, as would be anticipated 
  20if the game outcomes are orthogonal to other covariates, conditional on the spread.
29  The 
estimates suggest that an upset loss leads to an approximately 8% increase in the rate of male-on-
female at-home IPV.  The point estimate of the effect of a loss when the game is predicted to be 
close is about one-half as large in magnitude and not significantly different from zero.  The 
estimated effects of an upset win are positive but again not significantly different from 0 in any 
of the models. 
  The signs and relative magnitudes of these estimates are consistent with the predictions 
of our simple model.  Recall from equation (5) that the effect of a loss relative to a win is 
predicted to be most negative when the ex ante probability of victory is high, reflecting two 
complementary channels.  When the home team is expected to win more violence-prone men are 
predicted to watch the game, and among watchers the emotional cue of a loss is most negative 
when the probability of victory was high.  Taken literally, our estimates suggest the interaction 
effect is quite powerful: though an upset loss has a fairly big effect on the rate of IPV, we see 
only small (1-2%) effects of an upset win. 
  In column 5 we explore the effect of controlling for the number of households tuned in to 
watch a local game.  The Nielsen audience ratings are a significant factor in game day violence, 
with intimate partner violence rising by almost 1% for each percentage point increase in the 
number of households watching the game.  Importantly, however, the addition of this proxy for 
the number of couples at home together during a game has no effect on the estimated impacts of 
the game outcomes.  Since the results with and without viewership controls are similar and the 
                                                 
29 Estimates of the coefficients associated with seasonality, holiday, and weather variables are jointly significant and 
available on request from the authors. 
  21Nielsen data does not exist for the first two years of our NIBRS dataset, in most of the remaining 
analyses, we do not include the viewership controls.
30
  The models in Table 4 control for the pre-game point spread using a simple set of 
indicators for 3 ranges of the spread.  As an alternative, we fit a model with a second order 
polynomial in the point spread and interactions of this polynomial with a dummy for a home 
team loss. (All other control variables are the same as in column 3 in Table 4.)  The implied 
effects of a home team loss for each value of the point spread are plotted in Figure 5.  As in the 
specifications in Table 4, the increase in at-home male-on-female violence is a declining function 
of the spread.  The pointwise confidence intervals indicate that this difference is significantly 
different from zero for spreads less than approximately −3, which coincides with our definition 
of a predicted win.  For predicted close games (spreads between −3 and 3), there is a positive but 
declining impact of a loss versus a win, which is not statistically different from zero.  Finally, the 
curve is close to zero for spreads greater than 3 (the predicted loss category).  This pattern 
provides empirical support for our behavioral model, where the strength of the cue depends on a 
rationally expected reference point and individuals have gain-loss utility.  
 
V. Extensions and Robustness Checks 
a. Intra-day Timing of Violence Reports 
  Our baseline specifications examine the effect of NFL game outcomes on the rate of IPV 
in the twelve hour period starting at 12 PM on the day of the game.  Using NIBRS information 
on the timing of incident reports (which is coded to the hour of the day) we can refine these 
models and check whether the distribution of incidents over the day is consistent with a causal 
                                                 
30 Expanded results with Nielsen viewership ratings as controls are similar and available on request from the 
authors. 
  22effect of the game outcome.  Since about 70% of games in our sample started at approximately 1 
PM Eastern Time and another 25% started at approximately 4 PM ET, we fit separate models for 
incidents in various 3 hour time windows, allowing separate coefficients for games starting at 1 
PM versus 4 PM.
31  The models – presented in Table 5 – include the Nielsen rating for the 
number of households watching a game, although the estimated coefficients of the game 
outcomes are very similar when this variable is excluded. 
  Each column of Table 5 shows the effects of game outcomes on violence in a different 
time window.  For the 12 PM to 3 PM window (column 1) there is no significant effect of game 
outcomes on that day, regardless of when the football game actually occurred.  This is perhaps to 
be expected, since the game outcome has not yet been decided for either the 1 PM or the 4 PM 
games.  By comparison, for the 3 PM – 6 PM window (column 2) there is a significant effect of 
the game outcomes for games that started at 1 PM, but no significant effect of outcomes for 4 
PM games.  Interestingly, the effect of the Nielsen rating of the game is also significant for 1 PM 
games, but not 4 PM games.  Since the 3 PM – 6 PM window includes the last hour or so of the 1 
PM games and roughly 2 post-game hours, but only the first half of the 4 PM games, we infer 
that the violence associated with an unexpected loss occurs mainly after the game is over.  
  Between the hours of 6 and 9 PM (column 3) there is no significant effect of an upset loss 
for the 1 PM games, but a sizeable effect (a 34% increase in violence) for the 4 PM games.  
Interestingly, the upset win coefficient for the 4 PM games also provides the first sign of a 
protective effect from a positive emotional cue (a 24% reduction in violence) although the 
coefficient estimate is rather imprecise.  Finally, during the 9 PM to midnight interval (column 
                                                 
31 We do not include separate coefficients for games starting at 8 PM for two reasons.  First, there are very few of 
these games (6% of the sample), so there are only a handful of upset losses, close losses, and upset wins.  Second, 
until 2007, these games were broadcast on cable/satellite, and therefore exposure to the night game is much lower 
(see Table 3, Panel C). 
  234), neither of the two upset loss coefficients is statistically significant.  In sum, while the 
standard errors are fairly large, especially for the less-numerous 4 PM games, the data suggest 
that the spike in violence after an upset loss is concentrated in a narrow time window 
surrounding the end of the game. 
 
b. Emotionally Salient Games 
  If the link between NFL game outcomes and violence arises through the impact of 
emotional cues, as assumed in our model, then one might expect more “emotionally salient” 
games to have larger effects on the rate of intimate partner violence.   The models in Table 6 
explore the relative effects of game outcomes for more salient games (upper panel) and less 
salient games (lower panel) using the measures of salience introduced in Table 3.
32  In column 1, 
we define salience by whether the home team is still in playoff contention (based on having at 
least a 10% chance of making the playoff).  Among such games the effect of an upset loss rises 
to 10%, while the effect of a close loss rises to 6% and is also significant.  In contrast, when the 
home team is no longer in playoff contention the effect of an upset loss is small and statistically 
insignificant.  As shown in the third-to-last row in the table, the upset loss coefficients for the 
two game types are statistically different from each other at the 10% level. 
  Column 2 looks at games against a traditional rival team.  Interestingly, the effect of an 
upset loss is nearly twice as large for a rivalry game compared to a non-rivalry game (14% 
versus 7%), although the difference is not statistically significant.  There is also a marginally 
significant increase in violence following an upset win against a rival – a pattern that is 
                                                 
32 We fit the models in each column with a full set of interactions between the salience indicator and the 6 dummies 
representing the pre-game spread and its interaction with the game outcome. 
  24inconsistent with our model, or with the overall finding that upset wins tend to have a weak 
negative effect on IPV.  
  Games that are particularly frustrating could also generate a larger emotional response to 
an upset loss.  In column 3 we look at the effect of 3 potentially frustrating and relatively unusual 
occurrences: 4 or more sacks, 4 or more turnovers, or 80 or more penalty yards.  At least one of 
these events happens in 39% of the games in our sample.  For frustrating games defined in this 
manner, the estimated effect of an upset loss is 15%.  This effect is significantly different from 
the estimated 3% increase for non-frustrating games. 
  In the final column of Table 6, we restrict the sample to teams still in playoff contention, 
and which are either playing a traditional rival or experience an unusual number of sacks, 
turnovers, or penalties.  While 72% of games have the local teams still in playoff contention, the 
percentage of playoff-contention games drops to 40% when limited to traditional rivalries or 
unusually frustrating games.  The effect of an upset loss is now a 15% increase in IPV, compared 
to a 10% increase for all playoff-contention games in column 1.  Moreover, the effect of an upset 
loss is virtually zero for games which do not fit these criteria, with a reasonably small standard 
error.  The p-value for the difference in the coefficients appearing in row (a) and row (b) is 0.01.  
We conclude that the overall rise in IPV that we measure following upset losses is largely driven 
by the effect of losses in games that “matter” more to fans. 
 
c. Variation in Alcohol-Related Violence and Minor versus Serious Assaults 
  Incidents of IPV vary substantially in their nature and severity.  To gain some insights 
into the kinds of incidents that are most affected by the emotional cues of NFL game outcomes, 
we fit separate Poisson models for incidents with alcohol and/or drugs involved, and for serious 
  25versus minor assaults.
33  The results are summarized in Table 7.  The results in column 1 suggest 
that alcohol-related incidents of IPV are somewhat more affected by an upset loss than IPV 
incidents as a whole, though the standard errors of this model are relatively large.  The rate of 
minor assaults appears to be more responsive than the rate of serious assaults (columns 2 and 3), 
though again the power of our sample is limited.  Overall, our reading is that all forms of IPV 
rise following an upset loss, with some indication that alcohol-related incidents rise more.  We 
stress that this does not necessarily mean that upset losses lead to greater alcohol use that causes 
more violence.  Instead, the emotional cue of an upset loss may be larger for men who have been 
drinking heavily, causing a bigger rise in their likelihood of an interaction with their spouse or 
girlfriend that escalates to violence.  Some evidence on the latter channel is suggested by Exum 
(2002), who presents an experimental demonstration that alcohol use amplifies the effect of 
anger on intentions to commit aggressive behavior by young men.  
 
d. Results by Location and Victim-Offender Relationship 
  So far, we have focused on intimate partner violence against women occurring at home.  
Table 8 examines the effect of NFL game outcomes on other categories of intimate partner 
violence.  For reference, the first column of Table 8 reproduces the estimated effects for male-
on-female at-home IPV from column 2 of Table 4.  The second column examines male-on-
female violence away from home (which represents about 20% of total male-on-female IPV).  
Perhaps surprisingly, the point estimate of the effect of an upset loss on away-from-home 
violence is negative and marginally significant (t=1.8).  One (after-the-fact) explanation for this 
result is that couples who have been out tend to return home earlier following the unhappy event 
                                                 
33 Recall that in about 20% of incidents the reporting officer notes that alcohol or drugs were a contributing factor in 
the incident – these are the incidents with “alcohol involved”.  Serious assaults include aggravated assaults and all 
other incidents in which the victim was physically injured. 
  26of an upset loss, shifting the venue for subsequent interactions that lead to violence.
34  Column 3 
presents a pooled model for all forms of male-on-female IPV, regardless of where it takes place.  
Here we find a roughly 5% increase in violence for an upset loss, but no effect for the other 
unexpected game outcomes. 
  As noted earlier, a major controversy in the family violence literature concerns the 
victimization of men by their female partners.  Female-on-male IPV is only about one-fifth as 
prevalent as male-on-female IPV in the NIBRS.  The model in column 4 of Table 8 shows that 
NFL game outcomes have no large or significant effect on the rate of female-on-male violence.  
This could be because women are less likely to be emotionally engaged in professional football, 
or because women’s aggression is less responsive to emotional cues.    Finally, the last two 
columns of Table 8 break out at-home male-on-female IPV into violence against wives (column 
5) and violence against girlfriends and unmarried partners (column 6).   Both forms of violence 
increase following an upset loss, with a larger estimated effect on wives.  The standard errors on 
the effects are large enough, however, that we cannot reject an equal effect (t=0.9). 
 
e. Robustness to Sample Definitions and Other Issues 
  One issue with NIBRS is that agencies sometimes fail to provide data for one reason or 
another, creating “gaps” in coverage. Unfortunately, with the public use files there is no way to 
distinguish between a reporting gap and a period during which there were no reported crimes.  
This problem mainly affects smaller agencies (e.g., police forces in small towns or sheriff 
departments in small rural areas).  For larger agencies, a period with no reported incidents of 
crime is very unlikely.  In our main analysis we have assumed that the data for days where an 
                                                 
34 Note the number of municipalities falls to 583 compared to 765 in the model for at-home violence.  This occurs 
because agencies that appear in NIBRS for only a few years can have all zeros for away-from-home male-on-female 
violence for every observation. 
  27agency does not report a crime incident of any type (not just family violence) for an entire 24 
hour window is “missing at random”. 
  As a robustness check, we alternatively set the rate of violence to zero for these days.  
Reassuringly, our main results are very similar whether we treat “no crime” days as missing or 
true zeros: treating the “no crime” days as missing at random yields our baseline estimate of 
0.080 on the rate of male-on-female at-home IPV, while treating the “no crime” days as zeros 
yields an estimate of 0.078 (see Appendix Table 1, column 2).  We also re-estimated the model, 
limiting the sample to agencies with no “no crime” days for the entire 17 weeks of any given 
season.  As shown in column 3 of Appendix Table 1, the estimated effect falls slightly to 0.067, 
although this is partly due to the fact that upset losses appear to have a smaller effect on the rate 
of IPV in larger cities than in smaller cities (see columns 4 and 5 of the Appendix Table), and 
cities without any missing crime data are on average larger. 
  As is well known, the Poisson model implies that the mean number of events and the 
variance of the number of event are equal – a restriction that is often violated.  Typically, instead, 
researchers find that the variance is larger than the mean, a condition known as “over-
dispersion.”   With fixed jurisdiction effects this problem may be less of an issue, as much of the 
variation will be absorbed by the fixed effects.  To assess whether over-dispersion is likely to be 
an issue even after adding in fixed effects, however, we estimated a Negative Binomial model 
with agency fixed effects (see column 6 of Appendix Table 1).
35  The estimates are very similar 
to the baseline Poisson estimates, with the estimated effect of an upset loss equal to an 8.4% 
increase in IPV. 
                                                 
35 A negative binomial specification is appropriate if the mean of the Poisson process includes an unobserved 
random effect that is distributed as a Gamma random variable.  This model includes an additional parameter (related 
to the variance of the random effect) that shifts the variance of the counts in any observed area and time period 
relative to the mean. 
  28  Our baseline model includes fixed effects for year (12 years), week of the football season 
(17 weeks), and several holidays which occur during the regular football season (9 holidays).  As 
an alternative, we saturate the Poisson regression with dummies for each of the different Sundays 
included in our sample (204 Sundays).  The results are again similar to the baseline (see column 
7).  With the full set of Sunday fixed effects, the estimated effect of an upset loss is .074 
compared to the baseline estimate of .080.  The standard error on the upset loss coefficient 
increases by roughly 20 percent, which is perhaps to be expected since there are only 1,054 local 
regular season Sundays distributed over the 204 Sundays in our sample. 
  Finally, we also estimated separate models for different age categories of offenders and 
for violence against a victim other than an intimate partner.  In columns 8 and 9, we classify 
incidents of male-on-female IPV by the age of the offender (i.e., the male partner).  We find that 
the effect of upset losses have a slightly larger effect on the rate of violence committed by 
offenders under the age of 30 (9.7%) than those over age 30 (7.5%) but the gap is not statistically 
significant.  In column 10, we consider violence committed against any family member other 
than an intimate partner, such as violence against a child, sibling, parent, or in-law.  We find no 
evidence that unexpected emotional cues from football games affect family violence defined in 
this way.  Although not shown, we also find no evidence that upset losses matter for the 
narrower category of violence against a child, although the estimates are imprecise given the 
relative rarity of such incidents.  In the final column of the Appendix Table, we examine 
violence where the victim is not a family member or intimate partner, but otherwise known to the 
offender (e.g., a friend or neighbor).  Interestingly, the pattern of coefficients in column 11 is 
very similar to what we find for intimate partner violence.  An upset loss increases “friend” 
  29violence by a statistically significant 7.7%, while a close loss has a 5.1% effect, and an upset win 
has hardly any effect.  
 
VI. Discussion 
  Our empirical results show a roughly 8% effect of an upset loss by the local NFL team on 
the rate of male-on-female at-home intimate partner violence.  To provide some context for the 
magnitude of this effect we estimated a set of Poisson models for the rate of IPV on all days of 
the year for the set of states of our estimation sample.  These models included agency fixed 
effects, an expanded set of holiday dummies, dummies for the day of the week, the month, and 
the sample year, and the same set of weather controls included in our main models.
36  The 
resulting estimates (available on request) show large and precisely estimated effects of major 
holidays on the rate of IPV: for example, Christmas day +17%, Thanksgiving +22%, Memorial 
Day +30%, New Year’s Day +19%, New Year’s Eve +32%,and July 4
th +28%.  They also show 
a significant positive effect of hotter weather: relative to a day with a maximum temperature less 
than 80 degrees, IPV is 8-10% higher when the maximum temperature is over 80.  Thus, an upset 
loss is comparable to the effect of a hot day, or about one-quarter of the effect of a holiday like 
Memorial Day or New Years Eve.  We view the relative magnitude of the upset loss effect as 
rather large, considering that only a fraction of the population are serious football fans, and that 
our samples largely exclude the cities in which the NFL teams are located (though they often 
include nearby suburbs). 
  From a broader perspective we draw two main conclusions from our findings.  First, at 
least a fraction of intimate partner violence appears to represent expressive behavior that is 
                                                 
36 These models, like our main results in Table 4, were fit using data on male-on-female at-home incidents from 
noon to midnight only. 
  30triggered by payoff-irrelevant emotional shocks, rather than strategic instrumental violence that 
is used to control an intimate partner.  We emphasize that we are not arguing against an 
instrumental interpretation of some types of family violence.  Rather, our results show that a 
loss-of-control paradigm may be useful in understanding some part of intimate partner violence.  
Second, there appears to be empirical support for use of a gain-loss utility framework (with a 
“rational” reference point) for interpreting the effect of emotional cues on the loss of control in 
intimate partner interactions.  We suspect that the same framework may prove useful in other 
settings where economists are trying to model the effect of visceral influences on observed 
behavior. 
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  34Table 1.  Summary Statistics for Intimate Partner Violence, NIBRS data, 1995-2006. 
 
   
 
 
Intimate Partner Violence 
Daily Rate for the hours of 
12 PM to 11:59 PM 
Per 100,000 Population 
   
   
A.  All Days of the Year, Male on Female Occurring at Home 
   
Day of Week and Season  
   All Days  .70 
   Monday – Friday  .65 
   Saturday  .80 
   Sunday  .87 
   Regular Football Season (approx. Sept-Dec)  .68 
   Summer (June, July, Aug)  .71 
   
B.  Sundays During Regular Football Season 
   
Location and Victim-Offender Relationship  
   Male on Female  1.07 
      Occurring at Home  .87 
         Against Spouse  .47 
         Against Girlfriend  .40 
      Occurring Away from Home  .20 
   Female on Male  .24 
   
C.  Sundays During Regular Football Season, Male on Female, Occurring at Home 
   
Alcohol Use and Assault Severity   
   Alcohol Involved  .17 
   Minor Assault  .42 
   Serious Assault  .45 
   
Time of Day (all times Eastern Time)  
   12 PM to 2:59 PM  .17 
   3 PM to 5:59 PM  .19 
   6 PM to 8:59 PM  .26 
   9 PM to 11:59 PM  .26 
   
Municipality Size  
   Smaller Cities or Counties (pop<50K)  .91 
   Larger Cities or Counties (pop≥50K) .74 
   
Age  
   Younger Offenders (age<30)  .33 
   Older Offenders (age≥30) .53 
   
Notes:  Data are reports of intimate partner violence to local police agencies in the National Incident-Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS).  Intimate partner is defined as a spouse (including common law and ex spouse) or a 
boyfriend/girlfriend.  Violence is defined as aggravated assault, simple assault, or intimidation.  See notes to Table 7 
for definitions of alcohol use and assault severity. 
 Table 2.  NFL Football Teams Matched to NIBRS Agencies. 
 
   Season 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
              
 
Carolina Panthers (SC)              
   Regular Season W-L Record  7-9  12-4* 7-9  4-12  8-8  7-9  1-15  7-9  11-5*  7-9  11-5* 8-8 
      #  of  reporting  agencies  12 51 62 27 59 60 53 58 63 69 65 62 
   Pop. coverage (thousands)  737  1,912  2,522 1,039 2,147 2,408 2,064 2,528  2,745  2,305 2,436 3,034 
 
Denver Broncos (CO)              
   Regular Season W-L Record      12-4* 14-2* 6-10  11-5* 8-8  9-7  10-6*  10-6* 13-3* 9-7 
      #  of  reporting  agencies      23 21 20 20 22 23 23 21 25 29 
   Pop. coverage (thousands)      1,454 1,413 1,385 1,469 1,530 1,558  1,640  1,746 1,900 1,990 
 
Detroit Lions (MI)              
   Regular Season W-L Record  10-6*  5-11  9-7*  5-11  8-8*  9-7  2-14  3-13  5-11  6-10  5-11  3-13 
      #  of  reporting  agencies  21 40 76 69 69 63 73 61 77 74 81 85 
   Pop. coverage (thousands)  711  1,644  3,065 2,982 3,016 2,575 2,996 2,846  3,464  3,516 4,258 4,386 
 
Kansas City Chiefs (KS)              
   Regular Season W-L Record            7-9  6-10  8-8  13-3*  7-9  10-6  9-7* 
   # of reporting agencies            28  29  30  31  32  20  32 
   Pop. coverage (thousands)            669  627  745  1,032  1030  917  1,057 
  
New England Patriots (MA, NH, VT)            
   Regular Season W-L Record  6-10  11-5* 10-6* 9-7*  8-8  5-11  11-5* 9-7  14-2*  14-2* 10-6* 12-4* 
      #  of  reporting  agencies  10 11 18 21 21 25 40 37 56 62 66 62 
   Pop. coverage (thousands)  328  403  688  724  759  877  1,311 1,350  1,790  2,163 2,375 2,272 
 
Tennessee Titans (TN)               
   Regular Season W-L Record        8-8  13-3* 13-3* 7-9  11-5*  12-4*  5-11  4-12  8-8 
   # of reporting agencies        23  52  77  94  87  104  111  107  111 
   Pop. coverage (thousands)        631  1,343 2,786 4,151 3,990  4,570  4,709 4,788 4,861 
              
Notes:  A * next to a regular season record indicates that the team played in the postseason.  Reporting agencies can be either 
city or county municipalities within the state indicated in parentheses. 
 Table 3.  Summary Statistics for NFL Football Games and Nielsen Television Ratings. 
 








A.  All NFL Football Games, 1995-2006 
    
Day of Week and Season/Postseason   
   Regular Season Games            993  .95 
      Sunday Games         866        .87 
      Monday Night Football       68        .07 
      Thursday, Friday, or Saturday Games       59        .06 
   Postseason Games (36 on Sunday, 17 on Saturday)            53  .05 
    
B.  Sunday Regular Season NFL Games, 1995-2006 
    
Outcome   
   Loss  414  .48 
   Win  452  .52 
    
Predicted and Actual Outcomes   
   Predicted Win: Point spread < -3  316  .36 
      Actual Win        222        .70 
      Actual Loss  (Upset Loss)       94        .30 
   Predicted Close: -3 ≤ Point Spread ≤ 3  305  .35 
      Actual Win        151        .50 
      Actual Loss (Close Loss)        154        .50 
   Predicted Loss: Point Spread > 3  245  .28 
      Actual Win (Upset Win)       79        .32 
      Actual Loss        166        .68 
    
No Sunday Game   
   Played on another day of the week  127  .67 
   “Bye” week  62  .33 
    
By Time of Day   
   1 PM ET start time  587  .68 
   4 PM ET start time  224  .26 
   8 PM ET start time  55  .06 
    
Exciting or Frustrating Games   
   (a) Still in Playoff Contention  623  .72 
   (b) Against a Traditional Rival  201  .23 
   (c) Sacks≥4, Turnovers≥4, or Penalties>80 yds  341  .39 
   (d) Highly Salient: (a) and [(b) or (c)]  344  .40 
    
C.  Nielsen Media Research Local Television Ratings, 1997-2006 
    
Percent of Local TV Households Watching Game Average (%)  Max (%) 
Local Team Playing  24.2  47.9 
   1 PM Game     
      Local Team Playing  23.1  47.2 
      Local Team not Playing that Sunday  8.1  17.7 
   4 PM Game     
      Local Team Playing  29.4  47.9 
      Local Team not Playing that Sunday  12.3  22.2 
   8 PM Game (ESPN games only)     
      Local Team Playing  10.1  19.0 
      Local Team not Playing that Sunday  8.3  21.4 
    
Notes:  Starting times of games are approximate.  See notes to Table 6 for definitions of “Exciting or Frustrating 
Games.”  Nielsen ratings begin in 1997 for Carolina, Denver, Detroit, and New England; 1998 for Tennessee; and 
2000 for Kansas.  The Nielsen ratings for the 8 PM games do not include the 2006 season, as the broadcasts 
switched from cable/satellite (ESPN/TNT) to an over the air network (NBC) in 2006.  Average ratings for the 8 PM 
games in 2006 are 33.9% and 9.1% when the local team is playing and not playing, respectively. Table 4.  Emotional Shocks from Football Games and Male-on-Female Intimate Partner Violence 
Occurring at Home, Poisson Regressions. 
 
       
  Intimate Partner Violence, Male on Female, at Home 
     Baseline 
Model 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Coefficient Estimates      
Loss * Predicted Win (Upset Loss)  .083 .077 .080 .074 .076 
  (.026) (.027) (.027) (.028) (.028) 
Loss * Predicted Close (Close Loss)  .031 .034 .036 .024 .026 
  (.023) (.024) (.024) (.025) (.025) 
Win * Predicted Loss (Upset Win)  -.002 .011 .021 .013 .011 
  (.027) (.027) (.028) (.029) (.029) 
Predicted  Win  -.004 -.019 -.015 .000 -.068 
  (.022) (.032) (.032) (.033) (.044) 
Predicted  Close  -.012 -.017 -.016 -.007 -.074 
  (.023) (.032) (.032) (.034) (.044) 
Predicted  Loss  -.000 -.004 -.011 .006 -.057 
  (.022) (.031) (.031) (.033) (.042) 
Non-game  Day  --- --- --- --- --- 
Nielsen  Rating       .009 
       (.004) 
       
Municipality  fixed  effects  X X X X X 
Year, week, & holiday dummies    X  X  X  X 
Weather  variables      X X X 
Nielsen  Data  Sub-sample      X  X 
       
Log  likelihood  -42,890 -42,799 -42,784 -39,430 -39,428 
Number  of  Municipalities  765 765 765 749 749 
Observations 77,520  77,520 77,520 71,798 71,798 
   
    
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  Predicted win indicates a point spread less than -3 (negative spreads indicate 
the number of points a team is expected to win by); predicted close indicates a point spread between -3 and +3 
inclusive; predicted loss indicates a spread more than +3.  Municipalities are the NIBRS reporting agencies and can 
be either cities or counties.  The holiday variables include indicators for Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, New Year’s 
Eve, New Year’s Day, Halloween, as well as Thanksgiving, Labor, Columbus, and Veteran’s Day weekends.   
Weather variables include indicators for hot, high heat index, cold, windy, rainy, and snowy days.  The Nielsen data 
subsample is limited to observations with available television ratings; for earlier seasons, not all local markets were 
tracked by Nielsen Media Research (see footnote to Table 3). Table 5.  Timing of Shocks and Violence. 
 
        
  Intimate Partner Violence, Male on Female, at Home 
  




12 PM to 3 PM 
 
3 PM to 6 PM 
 
6 PM to 9 PM 
 
9 PM to 12 AM 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
       
Games starting at 1 PM      
Loss * Predicted Win  .024  .142  .042  .049 
   (Upset Loss)  (.071) (.066) (.060)  (.060) 
Loss * Predicted Close  .004  -.022  .010  .094 
   (Close Loss)  (.061) (.060) (.052)  (.051) 
Win * Predicted Loss  -.018  -.018  .055  .004 
   (Upset Win)  (.075) (.069) (.061)  (.060) 
Predicted Win  -.031  -.107  .096  -.180 
 (.107)  (.103)  (.088)  (.090) 
Predicted  Close  .011 -.098 .077  -.154 
 (.104)  (.100)  (.086)  (.087) 
Predicted Loss  -.057  -.020  .057  -.107 
  (.098) (.093) (.080)  (.081) 
Nielsen Rating  .000  .021  -.005  .020 
 (.011)  (.011)  (.009)  (.009) 
        
Games starting at 4 PM      
Loss * Predicted Win  -.066  .182  .347  .108 
   (Upset Loss)  (.189) (.163) (.130)  (.139) 
Loss * Predicted Close  -.003  .120  .007  .031 
   (Close Loss)  (.141) (.136) (.113)  (.117) 
Win * Predicted Loss  .085  -.008  -.245  .029 
   (Upset Win)  (.140) (.142) (.127)  (.120) 
Predicted  Win  -.311 .019 -.027  .008 
 (.182)  (.172)  (.144)  (.147) 
Predicted Close  -.323  -.069  -.044  -.085 
 (.185)  (.176)  (.147)  (.151) 
Predicted Loss  -.150  -.001  -.019  -.113 
  (.156) (.150) (.128)  (.131) 
Nielsen  Rating  .019 -.002 .013  .006 
 (.017)  (.017)  (.014)  (.014) 
Non-game Day  ---  ---  ---  --- 
        
Groups 562  592  624  624 
Observations 62,459  63,913  66,155  66,043 
       
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  See notes to Table 4.  Each column is a separate model which allows for 
separate coefficients for games starting at 1 PM versus 4 PM. 
 Table 6.  Shocks from Emotionally Salient Games. 
 
        
  Intimate Partner Violence, Male on Female, at Home 
        
  
Game Type = 
Still in Playoff 
Contention 
 
Game Type = 
Traditional 
Rivals 





Game Type = 
Highly Salient: 
(1) & [(2) or (3)] 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
      
More Salient Games (Game Type = 1)    
(a) Loss * Predicted Win  .102  .138  .152  .154 
   (Upset Loss)  (.030) (.062) (.046) (.041) 
Loss * Predicted Close  .062  .047  .016  .063 
   (Close Loss)  (.030) (.056) (.040) (.043) 
Win * Predicted Loss  .022  .145  .068  .015 
   (Upset Win)  (.039) (.067) (.045) (.053) 
Predicted  Win  -.019 -.040 -.060 -.038 
  (.033) (.046) (.045) (.040) 
Predicted  Close  -.041 -.030 -.014 -.057 
  (.035) (.048) (.043) (.045) 
Predicted Loss  -.017  -.051  -.019  .017 
  (.035) (.054) (.034) (.040) 
Less Salient Games (Game Type = 0)    
(b) Loss * Predicted Win  -.031  .067  .032  .007 
   (Upset Loss)  (.069) (.023) (.038) (.038) 
Loss * Predicted Close  -.011  .032  .056  .030 
   (Close Loss)  (.040) (.027) (.032) (.030) 
Win * Predicted Loss  .022  -.007  -.007  .023 
   (Upset Win)  (.040) (.031) (.036) (.032) 
Predicted  Win  -.001 -.009 -.006 -.010 
  (.049) (.033) (.033) (.034) 
Predicted  Close  .033 -.013 -.017 -.005 
  (.041) (.034) (.034) (.034) 
Predicted  Loss  -.002 -.005 -.002 -.023 
  (.035) (.032) (.035) (.033) 
Non-game Day  ---  ---  ---  --- 
      
p-value for row (a) – row (b)  .08  .30  .04  .01 
Groups 765  765  765  765 
Observations 77,520  77,520  77,520  77,520 
      
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  See notes to Table 4.  Each column is a separate model which allows for 
separate coefficients by game type.  Still in playoff contention indicates that a team has a greater than 10% chance of 
making the playoffs given their current win-loss record, based on the probability that any NFL team made the 
playoffs with such a win-loss record between 1995 and 2006.  Traditional rivals indicates a game between 
traditional rivals, as defined by “Rivalries in the National Football League” on Wikipedia.  The row labeled “p-value 
for row (a) – row (b)” reports the p-value for the test of whether the coefficient reported in row (a) is significantly 
different from the coefficient reported in row (b). Table 7.  Alcohol Use and Assault Severity. 
 
     
  Intimate Partner Violence, Male on Female, at Home 







     
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
Loss * Predicted Win  .127  .096  .063 
   (Upset Loss)  (.063) (.040) (.099) 
Loss * Predicted Close  .045  -.017  .099 
   (Close Loss)  (.057) (.035) (.034) 
Win * Predicted Loss  .015  -.011  .068 
   (Upset Win)  (.065) (.040) (.038) 
Predicted  Win  -.063 -.020 -.053 
  (.074) (.047) (.044) 
Predicted Close  -.065  .048  -.098 
  (.076) (.047) (.045) 
Predicted Loss  -.074  .008  -.040 
  (.073) (.046) (.044) 
Non-game  Day  --- --- --- 
     
Groups  527 633 657 
Observations  61,543 71,142 72,859 
     
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  Alcohol involved indicates the reporting officer noted that either alcohol or 
drugs were a contributing factor in the incident.  Minor assault is defined as simple assault or intimidation without 
injury; serious assault is defined as aggravated assault or any assault with a physical injury. 
 Table 8.  Location and Victim-Offender Relationship. 
 
        
  Intimate Partner Violence, Male on Female, at Home 
        


















        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Loss * Predicted Win  .080  -.114  .049  .0162  .126  .075 
   (Upset Loss)  (.027) (.063) (.025)  (.0585)  (.044) (.040) 
Loss * Predicted Close  .036  -.028  .026  -.0513  .037  .042 
   (Close Loss)  (.024) (.055) (.022)  (.0506)  (.030) (.035) 
Win * Predicted Loss  .022  .004  .018  -.0356  -.031  .041 
   (Upset Win)  (.028) (.063) (.025)  (.0596)  (.046) (.040) 
Predicted Win  -.015  .111  .005  .0648  -.015  -.040 
  (.032) (.074) (.029)  (.0694)  (.048) (.046) 
Predicted  Close  -.016 .087  .001 .0960 .032 -.053 
  (.032) (.075) (.030)  (.0698)  (.046) (.047) 
Predicted  Loss  -.011 .075  .003 .0528 .025 -.057 
  (.031) (.073) (.029)  (.0679)  (.048) (.045) 
Non-game  Day  --- --- --- --- --- --- 
        
Groups  765 583 775 607 551 670 
Observations 77,520  68,498  77,985 69,830 57,561 73,608 
        
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  At home indicates the incident occurred at a residence/home; away indicates 
all other locations.  Spouse is defined as the victim being a current spouse, a common-law spouse, or an ex-spouse; 
girlfriend is defined as the victim being the offender’s girlfriend. 
 Appendix Table.  Robustness Checks and Additional Results. 
 
             
      
   


































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
           
Coefficient Estimates            
Loss  *  Predicted  Win  .080 .078 .067 .096 .070 .084 .074 .097 .075 .002 .077 
   (Upset Loss)  (.027) (.027) (.030) (.043) (.035) (.029) (.032) (.044) (.035) (.030) (.029) 
Loss  *  Predicted  Close .036 .042 .037 .034 .037 .038 .038 .029 .037 .020 .051 
   (Close Loss)  (.024) (.024) (.026) (.038) (.031) (.026) (.027) (.038) (.031) (.025) (.024) 
Win  *  Predicted  Loss  .022 .029 .027 -.009 .040 .019 .019 .064 -.006 .043 .005 
   (Upset Win)  (.028) (.028) (.030) (.043) (.036) (.029) (.031) (.044) (.036) (.029) (.028) 
Predicted  Win  -.015 -.006 -.004 -.045 .007 -.014 -.015 .004 -.038 .015 -.002 
  (.032) (.032) (.036) (.050) (.042) (.034) (.026) (.052) (.041) (.035) (.033) 
Predicted  Close  -.016 -.021 -.006 -.073 .026 -.019 -.020 .008 -.029 .024 -.020 
  (.032) (.032) (.036) (.051) (.042) (.035) (.028) (.053) (.042) (.035) (.033) 
Predicted  Loss  -.011 -.010 .001 -.034 .010 -.013 -.006 -.006 -.014 .045 .011 
  (.031) (.032) (.035) (.049) (.041) (.033) (.026) (.051) (.040) (.033) (.031) 
Non-game  Day  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
             
Number  of  Municipalities  765 765 447 651 134 765 765 651 723 733 711 
Observations 77,520  93,029  39,492 60,766 16,736 77,520 77,520 72,315 76,132 76,229 75,279 
             
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  See notes to Table 4.  In columns 1-9, the dependent variable is at-home, male-on-female intimate partner violence.  In 
the baseline model, if there is a day with no crime of any type (not just IPV) reported to NIBRS, that day is dropped and treated as missing at random.  Column 2 
alternatively treats these missing days as days with zero IPV.  Column 3 only includes municipalities in a given season if the agency reports incident data for all 
17 Sundays of the regular football season; this subsample is composed primarily of larger municipalities.  Column 7 includes dummies for the different Sundays 
included in our sample (204 Sundays).  The final three columns use different dependent variables for incidents occurring at home: column 10 uses violence 
committed against any family member except an intimate partner (for example, a child, sibling, parent, or in-law), column 11 uses violence against a friend, 
acquaintance, neighbor, or otherwise known victim who is not a family member or intimate partner. 
 
 Figure 1: Risk of Violence Following Loss or Win




























L = risk following loss
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Notes: Realized score differential is opponent’s minus home team’s final score.  The plotted
regression line has an intercept of .09 (s.e.=.21) and a slope of 1.01 (s.e.=.03).
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Note: Curve is fit from a regression of the probability of victory for the home team on a third order
polynomial in the spread.
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Note: Each rating point equals 1% of the total number of television households in the local market.
The plotted regression line has an intercept of 24.74 (s.e.=.28) and a slope of −.38 (s.e.=.04).
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Note: Dashed lines are pointwise 95% confidence intervals.
 
Figure 5: Differential Increase in Violence for a Loss versus a Win, as a
Function of the Spread